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INSTITUTIONAL ADVANTAGE IN COMPETITION AND INNOVATION POLICY
Herbert Hovenkamp*
In the United States responsibility for innovation policy and competition policy are
assigned to different agencies with different authority. Federal patent and copyright enforcement
date back to the Constitutional period in the late eighteenth century. Federal antitrust policy did
not come until a century later, although it was preceded by state common law and corporate law
governing restraints on trade.1
The principal institutional enforcers of patent policy in the United States are the United
States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO), the International Trade Commission (ITC), and
the federal district courts as overseen by the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit, and ultimately the Supreme Court. While competition policy is not an explicit part of
patent policy, competition issues arise frequently, even when they are not seen as such. For
example, the issue of patent scope is highly relevant to competition because overly broad patents
can knock competitive alternatives out of the market. For example, a patent that claims
technologies that the inventor did not possess can eliminate competition while doing nothing to
further innovation. The same is true of patent law’s requirement of nonobvious subject matter,
or "inventive step," which can stifle competition in ordinary products if interpreted too
generously toward patent applicants.
Nevertheless, there is little decisional law that expressly addresses patent scope as a
competition issue. In order to do this enforcers would need to assess patent scope within the
context of the market in which it occurs. For example, an overly broad patent on a reversewinding wristwatch does little competitive harm if reverse-winding watches are not much sought
after, the wristwatch market is competitive, and includes digital watches that do not need to be
wound at all. By contrast, the overly broad grant in 1903 to the Wright Brothers for a crude
airplane steered and stabilized by cables that twisted the aircraft's wings effectively foreclosed
(under the doctrine of equivalents) Curtiss' greatly superior technology with rigid wings and
ailerons, such as modern aircraft have.2
Occasionally the courts have injected competition concerns into patent law. For example,
the Supreme Court held in Traffix Devices that a firm could not obtain trade dress protection on
*
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the same structural design that had been protected by a design patent, by that time expired.
Design patent registration protects designs for limited times but then opens the market after
expiration. Trademark protection, by contrast, lasts indefinitely, so the firm was attempting to
leverage a limited term exclusionary power into one with an indefinite term. 3
Another use of competition policy to limit patent overreaching is the judge made patent
"misuse" doctrine, which is entirely a creature of patent law. In the United States the doctrine
originated during the Progressive Era, reaching its modern articulation in the 1930s and 1940s.4
It initially applied to arrangements where the patentee tied the purchase or lease of its patented
good to the purchase of unpatented supplies or other complementary goods. Unfortunately,
misuse doctrine went off the rails, condemning many practices that were neither harmful to
patent policy nor injurious to competition. As a result the doctrine is in disrepute today and the
courts are reluctant to apply it.5 In the process the courts lost an important tool for limiting
patent overreaching on competition grounds. A much more sensible approach would be a
revised doctrine of misuse limited to situations involving true competitive harm, and that had
narrower and more focused remedies -- mainly, a defense to a patent infringement claim or an
injunction against enforcement.6
On the competition law side, since the early 1900s American courts have had to confront
practices that implicate both competitive concerns and patent law.7 Over the next century
patent/antitrust policy veered between extremes, from periods characterized by heavy deference
to patent practices, even where they seemed obviously anticompetitive, to periods in which the
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courts viewed patents as little more than a competitive nuisance and used every opportunity to
apply the antitrust laws against them.8
A few relatively durable principles emerged from this history.
First, one must distinguish pre-issuance from post-issuance patent practices. The patent
application and prosecution process up to the time of patent issuance is heavily regulated and the
important decisions are made mainly by government officials. Under American principles of
implied antitrust immunity this allows little room for antitrust intervention. It is not antitrust’s
purpose to repair perceived deficiencies in other federal regulatory regimes.9 The possible
exception is improper conduct by the private applicant that deceives the USPTO into issuing a
patent when one should not have issued. Even in these cases, however, the patent system has a
panoply of remedies available that do not require antitrust intervention, including invalidation of
the patent or attorney fee awards for the costs of defending against improper conduct.
United States law does recognize the so-called Walker Process doctrine, which attaches
antitrust liability when an attempt to enforce an improperly obtained patent threatens monopoly.
Under United States law these remedies attach only to post-issuance enforcement actions,
however, mainly the filing of a patent infringement suits or making unfounded threats.10
Once the patent issues, the USPTO itself has little power to discipline anticompetitive
conduct outside of its authority to reexamine. The one thing the patent system does contain,
however, is a judicially created defense of "inequitable conduct" which can be asserted as a
defense to a patent infringement suit. Once sufficiently material and serious inequitable conduct
is found the patent is usually declared to be unenforceable. The standards for finding inequitable
conduct are very strict, however, and require knowing intent to deceive the USPTO by a false
claim or omission.11
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Second, after a period of aggressive and often harmful expansion, antitrust in the United
States has gone through a cleansing process that has made it a much more effective tool for
protecting consumer welfare.12 This is in sharp contrast to patent law, which remains strongly
producer oriented. While both systems are imperfect, antitrust also has the comparative
advantage in other ways. Our economic models of innovation remain much less robust than our
models of competition. For example, we simply do not know what the optimal duration or scope
of a patent should be, and there is increasing evidence that these numbers differ greatly from one
industry to another, while the patent laws generally do not. Antitrust law has become relentlessly
empirical in determining the actual market effects of various practices, not only in the economics
literature but also in litigation. Further, different markets often obtain different treatment,
depending on such factors as the number of firms, the height of entry barriers, or cost structures.
In this regard, patent law is very far behind. Further, there is a widespread view in the United
States that, whatever the optimal amount of innovation, the patent laws do an extraordinarily
poor job of producing it. They tend to overprotect and thus to overexclude.
Too often patent law takes a property rights approach rather than an innovation
economics approach to policy questions. One example is the requirement that a patent be granted
only for a “nonobvious” improvement, which is intended to ensure that patents are granted only
on things that others are unlikely to discover on their own. Defining the requirement rigorously
is crucial, because unlike copyright and trade secret law, patent law has no right of independent
invention: someone can infringe a patent even though she has no idea that the patent or the
technology it represents even exists. An empirical test for nonobviousness might ask how many
people appear to be discovering the patented invention independently. To be sure, information
about either patents or the technologies they represent might be disseminated by ways that are
difficult to test for. But that is not an excuse for failing to explore the issue. Only a small
percentage of litigated cases include claims that the defendant actually knew about the plaintiff’s
patent, and only 2% of decisions include a judicial conclusion to that effect.13 The incentive to
claim knowing infringement is high, because the courts can award significantly higher damages
for it. Nevertheless, if we are going to be in the business of condemning innocent discoverers for
patent infringement then we must make sure that patents are granted only for things that are
sufficiently nonobvious that there won’t be a large number of innocent discovers. Otherwise we
create monopoly rights in pedestrian changes.
Antitrust also has institutional advantages over patent law when analyzing the economic
consequences of certain practices. This is particularly true when we are talking about a postissuance practice, meaning that patent system oversight is minimal and the patent has become
12
13
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little more than a business asset. And it is especially true when the practice in question is not
authorized by the Patent Act, meaning that Congress has not spoken on the question. For
example, the Patent Act authorizes licenses and assignments generally, but not anticompetitive
licenses or assignments. It authorizes licenses to others to use the invention upon payment of a
stipulated royalty, but it does not authorize the patentee to pay others to stay out of its market.
The Patent Act authorizes territorial divisions in production licenses,14 but not those
accomplished by payment for shutting down. It does not authorize price fixing of patented
products. It refuses to condemn tying arrangements unless the patentee has market power in the
tying product,15 but it says nothing about exclusive dealing or resale price maintenance. On
exclusionary conduct, the Patent Act certainly permits the patentee to exclude by maintaining
reasonably brought infringement actions, but it says nothing about predatory pricing, discount
practices, or other practices that might violate either Section 2 of the Sherman Act or EU Article
102. For most of these situations the tools of antitrust are better suited to analyze the effects of
the practice. If Congress becomes concerned that the courts have overreached by condemning a
practice that is competitively harmless or that might facilitate innovation, it can always do so.
Indeed, it did precisely that in 1988, when it overruled several Supreme Court decisions by
passing a provision that made patent tying arrangements unlawful only when the patentee had
market power.
The Supreme Court acknowledged antitrust's institutional advantages in its 2013 Actavis
decision.16 The dispute was one of many involving "pay for delay" pharmaceutical patent
settlements under the Hatch-Waxman Act. The Act was intended to facilitate the transition from
"pioneer" to bioequivalent generic pharmaceutical drugs when the pioneer's patent either expired
or was declared invalid. The Act gives the first generic firm to file a formal notification of entry
a 180-day period of exclusivity once its own production begins.17 During this period the only
contemplated producers of the drug are the original pioneer developer and the first entering
generic firm. Once the 180 day period ends, other generics are free to enter as well. The 180
day period was designed to do two things: first, for many drugs a generic would be more likely
to enter the market if promised exclusivity. Permitting open entry by everyone might yield no
entry at all, for each firm would get only a small share of a competitive market. Second, the
exclusivity period was intended to encourage generic firms to challenge weak patents. Original
14

35 U.S.C.§261.
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17
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pharmaceutical patents on drug molecules are typically robust. However, the pharmaceutical
industry has a widespread practice of "evergreening," or extending patent protection by obtaining
follow-on patents for new uses, now dosages, new delivery methods, and the like. Overall, these
follow-on patents, which do not cover the drug's primary ingredient, are much weaker than
pioneer patents and their failure rate in litigation is much higher.18
The drafters of Hatch-Waxman did not foresee the temptation this created for the pioneer
and the first generic to preserve the patent's monopoly and divide the profits. Under a pay-fordelay settlement the pioneer patentee pays the generic firm a large sum, often in the hundreds of
million dollars, for its promise to say out of the market. The Hatch-Waxman Act’s exclusivity
provision effectively protects this little cartel from competitive entry. Further, because the
agreements at issue are patent settlements, the federal courts are reluctant to second guess them,
certainly if it requires an inquiry into patent validity. For that reason numerous lower court
decisions had upheld the settlements.
Parties often pay settlements in order to avoid costly litigation. But anticipated litigation
costs in infringements cases of this type typically run less than $10 million. Settlements in gross
excess of that amount suggest that something else must be going on. One possibility which the
Supreme Court acknowledged is that the generic has agreed to provide certain services to the
pioneer, and that the excess payment is no more than the price of such services. However, these
services -- typically marketing and distribution -- are sold on a robust market, and it difficult to
see how they could amount to such large sums. Valuation of such services is likely to be a factor
in future litigation.
More likely, the large payment reflects the parties' assessment that the patent is extremely
weak. The pioneer would not be willing to pay so much if its patent were strong. Second, the
large payment works in the Hatch-Waxman context because there are no other potential
infringers. Ordinarily a plaintiff with a dubious patent would not be willing to pay a large sum to
make a particular infringer go away. The payment would send a clear signal of patent weakness
and others would come into the market, either because they realize that the patent is weak or else
because they might also be able to collect a payment. The Hatch-Waxman Act prevents this by
keeping others out of the market of its own force. Indeed, once the settlement has been executed
it really does not matter how weak the patent is. No one may challenge it in any event.
Those advocating a patent law approach to the pay-for-delay problem are concerned that
an antitrust rule will discourage pharmaceutical innovation, although competition concerns may
be relevant at the margin. By contrast, those advocating an antitrust approach are concerned
18

See C. Scott Hemphill and Bhaven Sampat, Drug Patents at the Supreme Court, 339 SCIENCE
1386 (March 22, 2013); FTC, Generic Drug Entry Prior to Patent Expiration: An FTC Study 16
(2002), http://www.ftc.gov/os/2002/07/genericdrugstudy.pdf.
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about the practice's shorter run impact on product prices and output, but impact on innovation is
certainly relevant too. Not coincidentally, those advocating a "patent" approach to the pay-fordelay problem, including the Supreme Court dissent written by Chief Justice Roberts, are
reluctant to intervene, while those advocating an "antitrust" approach, including the Supreme
Court majority, are more willing to find a problem susceptible to fixing.
The boundaries of patent and antitrust law are defined by policy rather than nature. So it
is meaningless to debate about whether this is "really" a patent problem or an antitrust problem.
It is a policy problem that needs to be addressed in a way that makes the proper tradeoffs
between the incentive to innovate further and the consumer interest in competitive markets and
low prices. The real question is what is the best system for addressing it?
Today our antitrust tools for assessing the competitive effects of pay-for-delay
settlements are far more robust than our patent tools are. Indeed, we can go a step further: in
some situations, including this one, antitrust tools are even superior for assessing the impact of
such settlements on innovation. While our theoretical and empirical devices for evaluating such
issues as the impact of generic entry on drug prices, the welfare costs of monopoly pricing, or the
most plausible explanations for specific firm decisions are hardly perfect, they are reasonably
good. Further, they far exceed our ability to assess such questions as the optimal length of a
patent or scope of coverage needed to induce optimal invention rates. We are even further from
having robust doctrine for determining patent validity, as witnessed by the high reversal rate of
district court decisions in this area. In general, the more pro-patent the federal district court -and thus the more frequently it is chosen by plaintiffs -- the higher the reversal rates, including
more than half of the time in the patent-friendly Eastern District of Texas.19
As the Supreme Court observed in Actavis, a very high pay-for-delay settlement is good
evidence of two different things, power and harmful effects. On the power issue the validity of
the patent is irrelevant. The question is not whether the power was lawfully acquired, but
whether it exists at all. A firm in a competitive market has no incentive to make a high payment
to a rival to stay out of the market. First, price/cost margins are very close, leaving no surplus
for such a large payment. Second, in a competitive market the removal of a single firm will not
have a noticeable impact on the price. In this case the large payment is a share of the present
value of anticipated monopoly profits for the period of exclusion that the payment purchases.
How high a percentage is difficult to say. If the patent were acknowledged to be completely
worthless one might expect the parties to split the revenues of the future stream of monopoly
profits. It would not necessarily be an even split, and in any event the size of the payment would
decline as the patent appeared to be stronger. The alternative is entry and more competitive
19
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production with the generic, which leads to a significant reduction in pioneer profits. After 180
days the market will be open to others as well.
Use of a surrogate such as this to establish market power is not unusual. Economists do it
often, particularly in merger cases, even if their subsequent testimony requires them to define a
market. Further the method need be no less accurate than traditional methods involving market
definition and computation of a market share. This is particularly true in a product differentiated
market, where market definition assessments are always either over- or under-inclusive. If the
market is limited to the pioneer plus the generic -- that is, the molecule in question plus its
bioequivalent -- then the market will not exhibit much differentiation but the aggregate market
share will be 100% If the market is larger, including alternative molecules or procedures that
address the same condition, then the market share will be smaller but the market will be
differentiated. In such a case, direct measurement is likely to be superior.20 Defining relevant
markets is probably not the best way to measure power in such circumstances.
The large payment is also an indicator of anticompetitive effects and consumer harm, as
Actavis concluded. First, a very large payment is strong evidence that the parties themselves
think the patent is very weak or invalid. Otherwise the pioneer would not make a payment out of
proportion to litigation expenses plus a reasonable estimate of the value of services that the
generic might provide. That, incidentally, is a market based assessment of the patent’s strength,
and as such it is very likely more reliable than a court’s determination. It the parties have
calculated a, say, 70% likelihood that the patent will be invalid, given what they know about
similar situations, that statistical assessment is more valid than the ultimate decision of the court,
which could be wrong about half the time. Given the high likelihood of invalidity, the high
payment then indicates that this generic is delaying or foregoing entry in order to maintain the
high prices currently being charged.
Under United States law such a settlement could be challenged by either the government
of else private plaintiffs. Overcharge damage actions would be available to direct purchasers
under federal law and indirect purchasers under the antitrust laws of some states. Any party with
a sufficient injury or threat of injury could also get an injunction. Patent invalidity need not be
proven, but the plaintiff will have to show a payment that is unreasonably high in relation to
litigation costs and the fair market value of any services that the generic has contracted to
provide. Liability would ordinarily be shared by the pioneer and the generic firm, both of whom
are voluntary participants in an unlawful restraint of trade.21

20

See 2B Phillip E. Areeda & Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law ¶¶512, 521 (4th ed. 2014).
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Conclusion
For a lengthy period in United States history patents were treated as monopolies, a view
that showed up in various ways, including a presumption of market power, at least for tying
arrangements.22 Today that view is largely abandoned in favor of one that regards patents as a
form of property, nothing more. They are business assets that often confer no market power,
although occasionally they do. Further, an issued patent is an "unregulated" business asset. The
patent system and has little to say about how a patent is used, and in this case the Patent Act
itself is silent. Then, as the Supreme Court realized in Actavis, the antitrust system is the better
placed institution.

22

E.g., International Salt Co. v. United States 332 U.S. 392 (1947), overruled by Illinois Tool
Works, Inc. v. Independent Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28 (2006).

